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LEARNING,  LOCAL INTERACTION,  AND  COORDINATION 
BY GLENN  ELLISON 1 
This  paper  discusses  the  dynamic  implications  of  learning  in  a  large  population 
coordination  game,  focusing  on  the  structure of  the  matching process which  describes 
how players meet. As in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) a combination of experimenta- 
tion  and myopia creates  "evolutionary" forces which lead  players to coordinate  on  the 
risk dominant equilibrium. To  describe play with finite time  horizons it is necessary to 
consider  the  rates  at which  the  dynamic systems  converge.  In  large  populations  with 
uniform  matching,  play  is  determined  largely by  historical  factors.  In  contrast,  when 
players  interact  with  small  sets  of  neighbors  it  is  more  reasonable  to  assume  that 
evolutionary forces may determine the outcome. 
KEYWORDS:  Learning, neighbors, coordination, rates of convergence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
EVEN  THE  SIMPLEST  GAME  THEORETIC  MODELS  all too  often have multiple 
equilibria.  A typical example is the coordination  game which arises when two 
players  must work together in order to achieve a commonly  desired outcome, 
but in which neither player  will benefit from his efforts  if his partner  does not 
do his part. We regard  the players  working  together as the "good"  equilibrium 
and speak of coordination  failure if it does not occur. In trying  to understand 
play in such games  we are led to ask  why  we should  expect  players  to coordinate 
on an equilibrium  and whether there is any reason to believe that one equilib- 
rium  is more likely than the other. 
Recent models of  Foster and Young (1990), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 
(1993), and Young (1993) have derived  surprisingly  strong  predictions  by explor- 
ing the disequilibrium  process  by which players  learn their opponents'  play and 
adjust their strategies over time. For the case of 2 x 2 coordination  games, 
Kandori,  Mailath,  and Rob (KMR)  (1993) show that the simple combination  of 
random experimentation  or mutations and the myopic attempts of players to 
coordinate with those around them creates powerful dynamic forces which 
influence  the evolution  of play over time. In analyzing  the long run limit of this 
dynamic  process,  they show  not only that players  will achieve  coordination  on an 
equilibrium,  but that one particular  equilibrium,  the "risk dominant equilib- 
rium"  will be selected.2 
While  providing an  elegant characterization  of  the  long  run influence 
of  evolutionary  forces, the KMR analysis is incomplete as a description of 
1I would like to  thank Drew  Fudenberg,  Sara Fisher Ellison,  Michi Kandori, Jeff Zwiebel,  an 
editor, and two anonymous referees for their comments. Financial support from the Sloan Founda- 
tion is acknowledged. 
2 See  Young  (1993) and Kandori and Rob (1992) for a discussion of play in broader classes  of 
games under similar behavioral rules. 
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economic  systems in that it does  not consider whether the  evolutionary forces 
would be felt within a reasonable time horizon. In fact, the dynamics justifying 
their  solution  are  implausible  for  the  large  populations  we  would  want  to 
consider to discuss the origins of conventions  or focal point in society. In this 
paper, I show that to assess the relevance of evolutionary forces it is necessary 
to  consider  the  rate  at which  play  converges  to  its  long  run limit.  Such  an 
analysis yields two main conclusions.  First, the  nature (local  or global) of  the 
interactions within a population are a crucial determinant of play. Second, when 
interactions are local, the  evolutionary arguments of KMR may be  reasonably 
applied to large populations. 
To  examine  the  play of  coordination  games  in large populations  I  adopt  a 
framework similar to  that  of  KMR.  In  each  period  of  a  dynamic model  the 
players are randomly matched and each pair plays a 2 x 2 coordination game. 
The behavioral assumptions incorporate noise and myopic responses by bound- 
edly rational players. The model departs from that of KMR in that it allows for 
different matching processes  within the  population.3 I focus  on  two extremes 
among the possible matching rules which I will describe as uniform and local. 
The uniform matching rule is that used in KMR. In contrast, I will describe as 
local  a  matching  rule  in  which  players  interact  with  a  small  group  of  close 
friends, neighbors, or colleagues. 
This paper also departs from KMR in that I consider the rate at which each 
dynamic process  converges.  If,  as will be  the  case  for one  model,  a dynamic 
system  takes  10100  periods  to  approach  its  limit,  the  limit  is  not  a  good 
prediction for what we will see when the game is repeated a few hundred times. 
While it is very hard to draw a dividing line and say exactly how fast a system 
must converge for the limit to be relevant, the models of this paper will exhibit 
such extreme contrasts that meaningful conclusions are possible. When a system 
adjusts very slowly, I will conclude  that whatever historical factors determine 
the initial play will continue to determine play long into the future. The model 
of KMR with a large population is one such example. On the other hand, when 
a system approaches its limit quickly, I will conclude  that we  should expect to 
see the limiting behavior. 
The  paper  is  structured as  follows.  The  model  is  described  in  Section  2. 
Section 3 contains some simple examples of the dynamics of the learning model. 
Section 4 contains the main theoretical results on both limiting distributions of 
play and rates of  convergence.  Section  5 discusses numerical simulations of  a 
broader range of specifications. 
3 In independent work, Blume (1992) develops a related continuous time model in which players 
are spatially distributed and interact with a finite set of neighbors. This model is discussed further in 
Section 4. The importance of particular population structures has long been discussed in evolution- 
ary biology. S. Wright (1931) first argued that small isolated subpopulations allowed more genetic 
drift and were hence particularly amenable to evolution. See Ewens (1979), especially Sections  1.6, 
3.9, and 10.3 for a discussion of more recent work. LEARNING  1049 
2.  THE  MODEL 
2.1.  Coordination Games with Bounded Rationality 
The model described  here has two classes of assumptions:  those concerning 
the  nature of  the  game being played and those  describing the  particular 
behavioral  rules which players  follow. 
The basic  model is of a repeated  game played  in periods t = 1,  2,3,....  There 
is a large population  of N players  (perhaps  a few hundred  for typical  applica- 
tions). In each period, player i chooses one of two possible actions a j  E  {A,  B}. 
The payoff  to player i is given by 
ui(ait,  a  -it)  =  E  7rijg(ait,  ajt) 
joi 
where the payoffs g are those of the 2 x 2 coordination  game in illustration  A. 
Formally,  it is required  that a > d and b > c so that (A, A) and (B, B) are both 
Nash  equilibria. In addition, I assume  that (a -  d) > (b -  c)  so that (A, A)  is 
the "risk  dominant"  equilibrium  as defined  in Harsanyi  and Selten (1988).  Note 
that when the strategies have equal security  levels (c =  d), (A, A) is also the 
Pareto optimum. 
In many applications,  we will envision the players to be playing a random 
matching  game in which case the weights rrij  will represent  the probability  that 
players  i and j are matched  in a given  period, and g(ait, ajt) gives the payoff  to 
player i when he is matched  with player  j. 
Rather than assuming  complete rationality,  I simply  specify  behavioral  rules 
which are a special case of those described  in KMR. The rules are intended to 
capture the  intuitive notion that players usually react myopically to  their 
environment.  In particular,  I assume  that in period t player i chooses 
aite  argmaxui(aia-it-  ) 
a 
with probability  1 -  2e. It is important  that player i is reacting  to the distribu- 
tion of play in period t -  1, not to the action of one particular  opponent with 
A  B 
A  a,a  c,d 
B  d,c  b,b 
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whom he was matched.  Hence, player i must observe his potential opponents' 
actions, but be fairly naive in predicting  how they will play in period t. With 
probability  2E player  i chooses an action  at random  with 50-50 probability.  This 
randomization  is meant to capture  the cumulative  effect of noise in the form  of 
deliberate experimentation,  trembles in strategy  choices and the play of new 
players  unfamiliar  with the history  of the game. 
2.2.  Local and Uniform Matching Rules 
Within the basic framework  described above, I will contrast two extreme 
specifications  of the matching  process. I term the two types of matching  rules 
uniform  and local. The uniform  matching  rule is given by 
1 
=ij N-i  V] oi. 
The assumption  of uniform  matching  expresses  the idea that each player  has no 
information  about with whom he would like to coordinate  until after he has 
chosen his  action. This assumption might be  appropriate,  for example, in 
modeling  the interaction  of merchants  at a large trade fair where each partici- 
pant would know little about the others. With this rule, a myopic player will 
choose his period t  strategy  considering  only the fraction of the population 
playing  each strategy  at time t -  1, not the identities of the players  using each 
strategy. 
In contrast,  I will use the term local matching  as an informal  description  of 
several  matching  rules in which each player  is likely to be matched  only with a 
small fixed subset of the population.  For simplicity,  I will usually  envision the 
players  as being spatially  distributed  around  a circle. In the most extreme  local 
matching  rule, each player  is only ever matched  with one of his two immediate 
neighbors,  i.e., 
IT.i  =2  if i-e1-(modN), 
tJ  0  otherwise. 
Similarly,  for any k ?  1 we  can define a  rule where each player has 2k 
neighbors  by 
1 
-rj  2  if i - j -+1,  ? 2,. . ., ? k (mod N), 
0  otherwise. 
We could also assign positive probability  to any match with the probabilities 
declining  with distance  so a player  is usually  matched  with someone nearby,  e.g. 
for N even 
{  3  1  N 
I rr2  d2  for d = min{li  -jl,  N-  li-il  2) 
(1)  {j.~2d 
2  21 
(1)  7rij=  3  1 
11  -  2  ,  d  2  otherwise. 
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Local  matching  rules  are  appropriate  to  describe  situations  where  players 
interact not with the population as a whole, but rather with a few close friends 
or  colleagues.  For  example,  such  a  rule  might describe  the  interactions  at  a 
college  reunion where each participant knows in advance who he or she wishes 
to see. The contacts among a group of firms or economists might also be of this 
type. 
Before  moving on,  I would  like  to  emphasize  two essential  features  of  the 
local matching rules described above. First, each player assigns a large weight to 
a small subset of the  population.  Second,  there  is considerable  overlap in the 
groups of neighbors so that a player's neighbors' neighbors are likely to be his 
neighbors as well. The combination of these features allows for the existence of 
small clusters within  the  population,  each  member  of which  is matched  with 
another member with probability at least  2.  The  possibility of  a new strategy 
gaining  a  foothold  within  one  of  these  clusters  allows  for  a  relatively rapid 
transition to the risk dominant equilibrium. 
3.  MODEL  DYNAMICS 
For the remainder of this paper, I discuss the dynamic pattern of play in the 
model described above. The approach of the paper is as follows. I assume that 
at  some  point  in  the  past,  arbitrary historical  factors  determined  the  initial 
strategies of the players. The behavioral rules then generate  a dynamic system 
which  describes  the  evolution  of  players'  strategy  choices  over  time.  I  will 
formally discuss both the limit of this system and the rates at which the limit is 
approached.  First though,  I  describe  the  dynamic evolution  of  play in  a  few 
simple cases in order to motivate subsequent results. 
The  dynamics of the model with uniform matching are virtually identical to 
those  described in KMR. Let  qi be  the  fraction of  player  i's  opponents  who 
played A  in period  t -  1. Note  that 
(2)  uj(A,  a-i,-1)  > ui(B,  a-i,-1)  <* qia +  (1  -  qj)c  > qid  +  (1  -  qj)b 
b -  c 
(a  -  d)  + (b -  c) 
Hence,  player i will play A  in period  t if and only if qi > q* (assuming player i 
chooses  A  when  he  is  indifferent).  The  assumption  that  (A, A)  is  the  risk 
dominant equilibrium implies that q* <2.  I will frequently discuss the behavior 
of the model with payoffs a = 2, b'= 1, and c = d =  O so that q* -3and  player 
will play A  if at least  3  of his opponents  did so. 
At  time  t,  we  describe  the  state  st  of  the  system  by  an  N-tuple 
(a1, a2, . ..,  aN)  E S = {A, B}N  indicating the strategy used by each player. I will 
write  A  as  shorthand  for  the  state  (A,  A,...,  A)  and  B  for  (B, B,...,B). 
Because all players have nearly identical sets of possible opponents, the dynam- 
ics are largely determined by the total number of players playing A, which will 
be denoted  by A(st). 1052  GLENN  ELLISON 
If A(st)  < [q*(N  -  1)], then  q, < q*  for all i so all players play B  in period  t + 1 and 
St  I =B.  ([xl  indicates the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.) 
If A(st) > [q*(N  -  1)], then  q, > q*  for all i so all players play A  in period t + 1 and 
s,+  =A. 
If  A(st)  = [q*(N  -  1)], we have a knife edge case where q, < q*  if player i played A 
in period t, and qi > q*  if player i played B in period t. The result is that A(s,+ I) = N - 
[q*(N  -  1)] as only those players who played B  in period  t  play A  in period  t + 1. 
While unsightly, this transition does not play a significant role in the subsequent 
analysis so the reader should not be too troubled by it. 
What is important is that the model with uniform matching and no noise has 
two  steady  states  A  and  B  corresponding  to  the  Nash  equilibria where  all 
players coordinate on one of the strategies. Further, if play starts close to either 
steady state it immediately jumps to that equilibrium. When noise is introduced 
the  transitions are governed by a Markov process,  but once  play approaches 
either equilibrium it will likely remain nearby for a long period of time. To see 
this, suppose that most players played B in period t so that A(st)  < [q*(N  -  1)]. 
Each player then plays A  in period  t + 1 with probability e. These  randomiza- 
tions are independent  and unless [q*(N  -  1)1 8-probability events occur every- 
one will again have B  as a best  response  in period  t + 2. There is no gradual 
evolution  from  one  equilibrium to  the  other,  only  the  possibility  of  a jump 
caused by coincident randomizations. When  E is much smaller than q*  we will 
have to wait a long time for this to occur. 
In models of local interaction, the dynamics are dependent on the locations of 
the  players using  each  strategy in  addition  to  the  aggregate  frequencies.  To 
illustrate the dynamics of such models, I discuss a typical case where N  players 
are arranged around a circle and each places  equal weight on being matched 
with his eight closest neighbors. Let the payoffs be such that q* =  so that each 
player has A  as his best response whenever at least three of his eight neighbors 
play A. 
Consider first the model with no noise.  Clearly there are at least two steady 
states, A and B. Each of these steady states has a nontrivial basin of attraction. 
If all but one or two of the players are playing B at time t, then each player has 
at least six neighbors playing B and hence will play B  in period  t + 1. We may 
write two such transitions as 
(A,B,B,...,B)  -B  (A,A,B,...,B)  -B. 
Similarly, for period  t states sufficiently close to A  we have st+1 =A. 
An important feature of the dynamics is that the basin of attraction of  B  is 
relatively small. In particular, the existence of a small cluster of players playing 
A  is sufficient to ensure that the dynamic process will eventually lead all players 
to play A. Suppose the period t state is (A,  A, A, A, B,...,  B) so that players 1 
through 4 played  A.  Players 1 through 6 and players N  and N -  1 all have at 
least three neighbors playing A. Those eight players will play A  in period t + 1. 
In period  t + 2, players  N -  2,  N -  3,7,  and 8 will  switch to  playing  A.  The 
cluster of players playing  A  will grow until eventually the  state  A  is reached. LEARNING  1053 
In contrast,  any relatively small cluster of  players playing  B  will disappear 
over time. It is easy to verify that 
(B, B, B, B, A, A, A  . ..  ,  A)  ->A, 
(B, B, B, B, B,B,B,A,...,~A)  ->  (A,A,B,  B,B,  A,..A)  --A. 
The basin of attraction of  A  is much larger than that of  B. 
It is the differing sizes of these basins of attraction which causes the relatively 
rapid  convergence  of  play  to  a  limit  concentrated  around  A  once  noise  is 
introduced.  From the  dynamics above, it should be  clear that we  usually only 
need  to wait for four well placed randomizations to create a cluster of players 
playing A  and lead us away from an initial condition where everyone is playing 
B. When the number of players is large, seeing four adjacent randomizations is 
far more  likely  than  seeing  the  (N -  1)/31  simultaneous  randomizations  re- 
quired to shift play in the model with uniform matching. 
The extreme local matching rule in which each player has only two neighbors 
is  neither  an  apt  description  of  any  economic  systems,  nor  does  it  have 
particularly compelling dynamic behavior. Nonetheless,  it is the easiest model of 
local  interaction  to  analyze,  and  hence  reappears  throughout  this  paper.  I 
briefly discuss its dynamics here. 
First, note  that regardless of the payoffs, the  assumptions that (A,  A)  is the 
risk dominant  equilibrium  entails  that  each  player  will  have  A  as  his  best 
response whenever at least one  of his two neighbors plays A.  In a model with 
no noise,  we  have two steady states,  A  and  B.  There  is also one  stable cycle 
when  N  is even, 
(A,  B, A, B,...,IA,  B)  (B,  A,B,  A,-,  B, A) 
(A,  B, A, B,-,  A,B), 
because  players  in  period  t  myopically  respond  to  their  opponents  play  in 
period  t -  1, not to  a forecast of their period  t  play. I will write  A  for the 
state (A,  B, A, B,...,  A, B)  and  2I for the  state (B, A, B, A,.,  B, A).  The 
most  important aspect of the  dynamics is that the  steady state  B  now has no 
other states in its basin of attraction. If at least one player plays A  in period  t, 
then  at least two players (his neighbors) will play A  in period  t + 1. Any state 
which contains a cluster of two adjacent players playing A  lies in the basin of 
attraction of  A.  Once noise is introduced, this leads to rapid convergence to a 
steady state concentrated around A. 
4.  LIMITS  AND  RATES  OF CONVERGES 
In  this  section,  I  discuss  the  principal theoretical  results  of  the  paper.  As 
mentioned  above, the motivation for the analysis here is the assumption that at 
some  point  the  initial  actions  of  the  players  were  determined  by  historical 
factors and that for some subsequent period of time play has evolved according 
to  the  behavioral rules  specified  above.  The  fundamental  problem  is then  to 1054  GLENN  ELLISON 
determine how historical and evolutionary forces combine to determine the play 
we observe. To this end, I first discuss the limiting behavior of these systems as 
the number of periods of evolution grows to infinity. Subsequently, I discuss the 
rates at which the limits are approached in order to assess whether the limits 
are  meaningful  given  that  the  economic  systems modeled  involve only  some 
reasonable finite repetition of play. 
As noted above, we may view the time t strategy profiles as the states st of a 
Markov process. We may represent the time  t probability distribution over the 
states by an 1 x  2N  vector  vt. The evolution of the process is governed by 
Vt+1  =  vtP(c) 
where P(e)  is the transition matrix whose elements  are given by 
Pij(e)  = Prob{st+1  = jlist =  i}. 
Write Pu(e)  for the transition matrix with uniform matching and p2k(e)  for that 
of the model with 2k  neighbor matching. For example, we have 
p!U(E)  8A(j)( 
-  )  N-A(j) 
whenever  i < [q*(N  -  1)1 as each player's best  response  is  B  so state  j  arises 
when  a  particular  A(])  e-probability randomizations  occur.  Note  that  each 
transition matrix  P(e)  is  strictly positive  for  E > 0  so  by standard results on 
Markov processes there is an unique steady-state distribution /i(e)  such that 
(4E)  =  (E)P(_E).4 
The  steady-state  distribution reflects  the  long-run behavior of  the  process.  I 
write  Wu(e) and  p2k(e)  for  the  steady  states  with  uniform  and  2k  neighbor 
matching, and  ,tL(e)  or ,u(e)(s)  for the  probability assigned to  state  s  by the 
distribution /L(e). 
Because  we  are  interested  in  small  e,  we  shall  consider  the  asymptotic 
behavior of  ,u(e)  as  E -*  0. We write f(x)  = 0(g(x))  (x ->  0) if there  exists a 
constant  C  such  that  If(x) I <  C Ig(x) I for  sufficiently small  x.  The  formula 
f(x)  = 0(g(x))  is said to be best possible if in addition there exists a constant 
c > 0  such  that  c lg(x)I  <  If(x)I  < Clg(x)I  .  In  each  of  the  theorems  of  this 
section the  0-approximations  are meant in this sense. 
The first result compares the steady state distributions of the uniform and 2k 
neighbor models.  KMR show that the evolutionary forces in a model virtually 
identical  to  the  uniform  model  yield  a  steady  state  limit  in  which  the  risk 
dominant equilibrium (A,  A) is played with very high probability. The statement 
that  1LL (e)  -*  1 and  bt2k(e)  ->  1 verifies this both for the uniform model I have 
defined and for the model with 2k  neighbor matching. The second part of the 
theorem  discusses  the  asymptotics  of  pL(e) in  order  to  give  a  more  precise 
comparison of the relative probabilities with which the entire population coordi- 
nates on the equilibrium (B, B). For sufficiently small e, this equilibrium is even 
4See  Karlin and Taylor (1975, p. 85). LEARNING  1055 
less common  in the model with two neighbor  matching  than it is under  uniform 
matching  (although  it is extremely  rare in both models). 
THEOREM  1:  Let  ,lU(e)  and  2k(8)  be  the steady state  distributions of  the 
general model of  Section 2  under the uniform and  2k  neighbor matching rules, 
respectively. Then, for N sufficiently  large 
(a)  lim IuA(E)  =1, 
lim  ,uf2(?)  =  1; 
-?  0  1 
(b)  tuy(e?)  =O(  ? N-2  [q*(N-1)1  +1 
2  o)=  Q(8N-2)  for  Neven, 
(B e  o(8N-1)  for N odd. 
PROOF:  Both the statement and the proofs of the results for the uniform 
model are virtually  identical  to those given in KMR, and hence I will omit the 
proofs. N  must be sufficiently large that [  q*(N  -  1)]  < N/2. 
The proof for the 2k  neighbor model relies on a characterization  of the 
steady state used by Foster and Young (1990) and KMR. The reader  may refer 
to those papers or to Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) for an exposition of the 
background material. An  x-tree  t on S is a function t : S -*  S such that t(x)  = x 
and such that for all s s x there exists m with ttm(s)  = x. We may think of an 
x-tree as a set of arrows  connecting  elements  of S in which  every  element has an 
unique successor  and all paths eventually  lead to x. The steady state distribu- 
tion  ,t2k(e)  is characterized by 
2(?)  =  C(?)  E  HP2)(e) 
teHx  i#X 
where Hx is the set of  x-trees on S. Note that p2k(e)  is a polynomial  in e 
whose constant  term is nonzero if and only if the transition  i ->j occurs in the 
model with no noise (e = 0). For any state x, the expression  above allows  us to 
express  the quantity  2k(c)/,.ik(e)  as a ratio of polynomials  in E. 
To get the result  in (a), it suffices  to show  that AX  k()/,tk(c)  0 as  ?  0 for 
all x  1.  This will follow if we demonstrate  that for N>  (k + 1)(k + 2) and 
any  x-tree  t  (x =A)  we  have  Hi  Pp2)(k)  -*0  This 
in  turn  follows  if  we  show  that  there  exists  an  A-tree  t'  such  that 
n  p2(k)(_)/nI  +i  p 2ttk(-  0. Write s(z)  for the successor  of state z  in the 
model with no noise and D(A) = {z lsm(z) = A  for some ml for the basin of 
attraction  of A. I show  that the latter ratio  converges  to zero by considering  two 
cases: 
Case 1: x E D(A). Define t' by 
t'(z)  =  /  s(z)  if z E D(Af), 
t (  z)  otherwise. 1056  GLENN  ELLISON 
t'  is  an  A-tree  because  for  any  state  z  the  path  z -> t'(z)  -*  t'2(z)  ... 
initially  coincides  with t and hence eventually  enters D(A). From  the first  point 
at which  t`m(z)  e D(i),  the  tree  maps every point  to  its successor  in the  no 
noise model and hence reaches A. The ratio is 
HI  Pit(i)(?)  PIt()(8)  H  Pit(i%(?) 
___  __  __  __i  e-D  U) -{4,  x} 
HI  Pit'(C)  Pxs(x)(6)  HFI P7s )(?) 
i+2  0ieD(U)-{2  ,x} 
The right side converges to 0 as e -?  0 because p(2k)/p2k)(8)  is bounded, 
Pik(  )(?-  0, and PXS(X)(e)  ->  1. 
Case 2:  x 0 D(A).  Define  t' by 
(s(z)  if  z ED(i  ), 
t (z)  t(z)  if z OD(i),  z ox, 
ty  if z =x, 
where y  is an element of  D(i)  such that px2k(E)  is of minimum  order. t' is 
again an A-tree. The ratio is 
n  2k  (?  2k  ?  HIP7i?(c)-)  H  P7t()(E) 
___  ___  __iE=D  (2 ) 
HPit'(?()  Pxy ()  H  Pis(i)(  ) 
i 0,  iE-D(4)  - {i 
The  denominator is  of  ?-order at  most  k + 1  because  p72k)  >  1  and the 
transition  x -*  y requires  at most k + 1 randomizations.  (Any state with k + 1 
adjacent  players  playing i  is in D(i).)  To see that the numerator  is of higher 
order consider  the product  Hl%'p2k  AtJ+1(A)(c)  where m is the smallest  integer 
such that tm(i)  0 D(i).  For i = 0, 1,...,  k + 1, let  r(i)  be the first time period 
such that  tr(i)(i)  does  not  have all players in the set {i(k + 1) + 1, ...,  i(k + 1) 
+ k + 1) playing A.  The transition tr(i) -1(if)  tr(i)(if)  involves a mutation 
among  the players  in that set because each of them had k neighbors  playing  A 
in period r(i) -  1. Hence, there are at least k + 2 distinct e-probability  events 
in this path and the numerator  is of order at least k + 2. 
For part (b), we find the minimum order i-  and B-trees explicitly. For 
example, for two neighbor matching  and N > 4 even, one can show that the 
minimum  order  A-tree  has  t(B)  =  (A,  B,  B,  . ..  ,  B),  t(AB)  = 
(B, A, A, A, B, A, ...,  B, A), and all other states mapped  to their successors  in 
the no noise model. The minimum order B-tree has t(i)  =  AB  and t( AB)  =  B. 
These trees are of order  2 and N respectively.  Q.E.D. 
REMARKS: 1. The fact that models  with local and uniform  matching  both have 
steady  state distribution  concentrated  on A is more  general  than the hypotheses 
of  the  theorem. The  proof does  not  rely on  the  fact that the  matching LEARNING  1057 
distribution has  finite  support. -It would  suffice for the  set  of  neighbors with 
whom a player is matched with probability 2q*  to be  finite or grow slowly as 
N -> oo. More  precisely,  it  suffices that  there  exist  k'(N)  such  that (k'(N)  + 
l)k'(N)  + 2) < N  and Ei[+ik'(N).rij  > q*  for all  i' E {i -  k'(N), . . ., i + k'(N)}. 
The matching rule given in (1) is one example. Further extensions are no doubt 
possible. 
2. The steady-state distribution is not concentrated on A if the matching rule 
is too  concentrated.  If  7rij  > 1 -  q*  the  steady-state probability of the cycle in 
which players i and j alternately play (A,  B)  and (B, A) while all other players 
play A  cannot vanish relative to the probability of  A,  because  a single e-prob- 
ability event leads from A to the cycle and vice-versa. 
3. The long-run outcome  of models with uniform and 2k  neighbor matching 
may differ once we move beyond 2 x 2 games. For example, Young (1993) notes 
that in a similar model the long-run outcome  in a 3 x 3 game is a complicated 
function  of  the  payoffs.  Modifying  his  example,  it  can  be  shown  that  with 
uniform  matching  the  steady-state  distribution  of  the  game  on  the  left  in 
illustration  B  is  concentrated  on  B  while  that  of  the  game  on  the  right is 
concentrated on C. Intuitively, the minimum order B- and C-trees are of nearly 
equal order in the two games, because while C is pairwise risk dominant B  has 
a  greater  advantage  against  A.  Because  the  orders  are  nearly  equal,  it  is 
possible  to  reverse  their  ranking with  only  a  small change  in  the  payoffs. In 
contrast, with two neighbor matching the dynamics (and hence the steady state) 
are completely  determined by the best  responses  to the six possible configura- 
tions  of  a player's neighbors: {A, A}, {A, B}, {A, C}, {B, B}, {B, C}, {C, C}. Each 
of these best responses are identical across the two games, so the outcome with 
two  neighbor  matching cannot  resemble  that with  uniform matching in  both 
games. 
Theorem  1 implies  that  if  the  coordination  games  we  have  described  are 
repeated  enough times, we expect eventually to see  the risk dominant equilib- 
rium played almost all the time.  It remains to be  seen,  however, whether this 
'eventually' is relevant.  If, for example, we  are modeling weekly  interactions, 
evolutionary forces will only be felt within a few decades  if they affect play in 
A  B  C  A  B  C 
A  6,6  0,5  0,0  A  6,6  0,5  0,1 
B  5, 0  7, 7  5, 5  B  5, 0  7, 7  5, 5 
C  0,0  5,5  8,8  C  1,0  5,5  8,8 
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the  first few  thousand  periods.  In  applying evolutionary arguments to  games 
which  are not  repeated  infinitely often,  we  must  ask whether  the  number of 
repetitions is sufficiently large for play in the game to resemble the steady-state 
limit we  have identified.  I begin with some  theoretical  results on  the  rates of 
convergence of models with uniform and local matching rules.5 
Let p be a probability distribution describing play in the initial period of the 
game. For the  Markov process with transition matrix P(8),  the distribution of 
period  t play is given by pP(e)Y.  The steady-state distribution reflects long run 
behavior in the sense that 
pP(8) t  ,-* / 
for any p as t -*  oo.  For any two distributions ,u and  i-  define 
II/L  -  Z11  maxlp., -  Zjl 
sES 
The quantity 11pP()Y  -  p.(8)JI  then measures the difference between  the distri- 
bution  of  play  in  period  t  and  the  steady  state.  In  discussing  the  rate  of 
convergence we are trying to say when this difference is small. 
To do so, I characterize the asymptotic behavior of  IIpP(8)Y  -  I(tW11  as t ->  oo. 
For finite state Markov processes, convergence is always at an exponential rate. 
(See Seneta (1973, p. 8).) Loosely speaking, we have JjpP(8)Y  -  p(8)II  = O(rt) for 
some r < 1. The distinction I draw between fast and slow convergence is simply 
a quantitative one comparing different values of  r. Meaningful comparisons are 
nonetheless  possible, because the values of  r turn out to be very different.6 
The  principal implication of  Theorem  2  is that when  8  is small,  r  will be 
much closer to one in the model with uniform matching than it is in the model 
with two neighbor matching. To see what kind of effect this has on convergence, 
consider the following numerical example. Suppose  there  are 100 players with 
payoffs such that rq*(N  -  1)] = 33. Suppose also that the randomization proba- 
bility  8  is  small  and  consider  the  effect  of  reducing  8  to  8/2.  In  the  two 
neighbor model,  the  model  will take  about twice  as long  to  converge.  In the 
model with uniform matching, Theorem  2 tells us that 1 -  ru(e/2)  2-(1  - 
ru(e)). If 1 -  ru(e) is small we have the first order approximation 
r  2  )  1  -3  ru(  r(?  ru(  )23  (-  333  3  ru(8). 
Hence,  convergence in the uniform model will take not twice as many periods 
but rather 233  or over 8 billion times as many. 
5See  Karlin and Taylor (1975, Ch. 3 and Appendix 2), or Seneta (1973, Sections  1.1 and 4.2) for 
formal statements of the theorems mentioned below. 
6 The idea of such a distinction may be puzzling, especially to econometricians who are used to 
seeing distributions converge at rate 1/  Vt  and think of exponential convergence as rapid. What is 
important to  note  is  that exponential  convergence  can  be  quite  slow in  a practical sense  if  r  is 
extremely close  to  one.  For  example,  if  r =  0.9999999,  then  r1'000'000 0.9,  so with every million 
periods play gets only 10% closer to the steady state. LEARNING  1059 
THEOREM  2:  Let Pu(e)  and P2(E)  be the transition matrices for  the uniform 
and two neighbor models and let  U.(0)  and  p72(E)  be the associated steady state 
distributions. Assume  [q*(N  -  1)] < N/2.  For  A the set of probability distribu- 
tions on S define 
ru(e)  = sup limsup  |ppU()t  _  U(e)  1/t 
pEA  t->oo 
r ( ?)-SUp  lim sup  pp2(e)t  _  2(e)  7 
peA  t->co0 
Then, 
1 -  ru(E)  =  O(  [q*(N-1)) 
1-  r2(?)  =(e), 
as  E  -?  0. 
PROOF:  To begin we simplify  the right hand side of the expressions  defining 
ru(E) and r2(c)  using standard  matrix  theorems.  Let P be any strictly  positive 
transition  matrix  and let ,u be its unique steady state. The first result is that if 
we order the eigenvalues  of  P  so that IA1  >  IA21  >  .-.  >  IAkNI,  then A1= 1 
and IA21  < 1. From this follows a result directly applicable to our problem, 
namely  that 
sup  lim sup IIppt _ /,11l/t  =  1A21 
pEA  t --c 
The proof of this second result for a diagonalizable  P  is quite simple and is 
sketched  below.7  Suppose 
P =PAP-Y1' 
A1  0  ...  O 
O  A 2 
...  ? 
A=[.  0 
0  O  ...  A 
For any fixed p, 
pPt = plAt?lY1 
Hence, 
r1  O  ...  -  **  O 
ppt  p,|  ?  ?P  ?  41  Po 
At  O?-1. 
7 For a nondiagonalizable  P  a similar argument can be constructed using the Jordan canonical 
form.  See  Karlin and Taylor (1975,  pp.  542-551)  or  Seneta  (1973,  pp.  1-8)  for more  thorough 
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The  right-hand side  of  this expression converges to  zero.  Writing Eij  for the 
matrix whose  ijth element  is  1 and with all other elements  equal to  zero, we 
have from the uniqueness of the steady state that 
pOEll  o1=  A 
for all distributions p. Hence, 
sup  lim supJJpPt-  pJJl/t  =  sup  limsuplIpPt-ppPE11  P1111t 
peA  t --ct  p  JA  t --c 
=  sup  limsup  )AtPo  At-El  )P 
= IA2  1 SUP lim sup lIpPE22  P'I 1/t 
pEA  t -4ct 
=  IA21. 
We also see from this calculation that the supremum is in fact achieved for any 
p such that pPE22j-1  # 0. 
Given this result, the problem of finding  ru(e)  and  r2(8)  is reduced  to  the 
problem  of  finding the  second  largest eigenvalues  of  the  matrices  Pu(8)  and 
P2(8).  The remainder of the proof is the rather lengthy solution to this problem 
and can be found in the Appendix.  Q.E.D. 
To better illustrate the behavior of models with local and uniform matching I 
define an alternate measure of the extent to which play resembles its long run 
limit by 
W(N,  e, a)  = E(min{tIA(st)  > (1-a)N}lso=B) 
i.e.  W(N, 8, a)  is the  expected  waiting time until at least  1 -  a  of  the  players 
simultaneously play A  given that everyone starts off playing B. Table I lists the 
value  Wu(N, e,0.25)  for  the  uniform model  for  two  sets  of  payoffs: the  first 
a = 2, b = 1, c = d = 0 as before, and the second a more extreme example where 
the payoff to (A, A)  has been  increased to 5. (See  the proof of Theorem 3 for 
the computation of  Wu(N, 8, a).  It is approximately 1/(1  -  ru(8))  for 8 small or 
N  large.) Table II presents Monte Carlo estimates of the corresponding waiting 
times W2(N,  8, 0.25) for the model with two neighbor matching. Comparing the 
tables, it is clear that the nature of the matching rule has a tremendous effect on 
the  pattern of  play. Moreover,  this basic insight is quite robust with extreme 
contrasts for values of  8  which are far from infinitesimal. In the uniform model, 
it takes  an extremely long  time  for play to  shift from one  equilibrium to  the 
other,  so  for  economically  reasonable  horizons  the  evolutionarily determined 
limits do not apply. This is not just a negative result. We can predict that play 
should exhibit great inertia with a historically determined equilibrium repeated 
over and over again. In the two neighbor model play shifts to the risk dominant 
equilibrium within six to  fourteen  periods,  suggesting that evolutionary forces LEARNING  1061 
TABLE I 
EXPECTED  WAITING  TIMES  WITH UNIFORM  MATCHING5 
Expected  Wait (a  =  2) 
0=O.025  E =  0.05  0.1 
N=  10  611  89  16 
N=  50  3.83 x 1014  6.54  X 109  2.63 x 105 
N= 100  1.30  x 1027  8.13  X 1017  3.09  X 109 
N=  1000  1.09  X 10266  1.96  X 10173  4.46 X 1088 
Expected  Wait (a  =  5) 
0=0.025  ? = 0.05  ? = 0. 
N=  10  42  13  5 
N=50  2.65 x  105  1324  19 
N=  100  1.86 x 109  1.06 X 105  49 
N=  1000  1.61  x  1082  1.82  x  1041  2.16  X 1010 
aN  = population  size,  E =  randomization  probability,  a = payoff to (A,  A). 
Other  payoffs  are  u(B,  B)  =  1,  u(A,  B)  =  u(B,  A)  =  0.  Waiting  times 
(Wu(N,  e, 0.25))  are  until  3/4  of  the  players  play A  simultaneously. 
TABLE II 
EXPECTED  WAITING  TIMES  WITH TWO  NEIGHBOR  MATCHINGa 
W2(N,  ?, 0.25) 
?=0.025  =0.05  0.1 
N=  10  14.5  9.0  6.2 
N=50  11.0  8.1  6.3 
N=  100  11.1  8.2  6.4 
N=  1000  11.0  8.1  6.2 
'Waiting  times  are  independent  of  payoffs  for  q* E (0, 1/2).  Estimated 
standard  errors  are 0.1  or less  for  all estimates. 
will be  a powerful determinant of play. I comment  later on the  robustness of 
this result. 
I noted in the introduction that models with local interaction are of particular 
interest  if  they  allow  evolutionary  arguments  to  be  used  in  discussing  the 
development of conventions in large societies.  I therefore ask now how the rate 
at which  play  converges  depends  on  the  size  of  the  population.  Theorem  3 
characterizes play in terms of the expected waiting time until a transition to the 
risk dominant equilibrium occurs. In the uniform model,  WU(N, E,  a)  increases 
dramatically in N  reflecting our ear'lier  intuition that the simultaneous random- 
izations which produce a transition become  extremely unlikely in large popula- 
tions. In contrast, with a local matching rule play approaches the risk dominant 
equilibrium within a period of time bounded  above by a constant independent 
of  N.  Intuitively, the proof formalizes the idea that players who are sufficiently 
far  from  player  1 cannot  significantly  slow  his  adoption  of  strategy  A  by 
considering the wait until player 1 plays  A  in a constrained model  where  all 
players m or more units away play B  in every period. Convergence times in the 1062  GLENN  ELLISON 
constrained model  are independent  of  N  and are shown to provide an upper 
bound on convergence times in the standard local matching model. 
THEOREM  3:  For e sufficiently  small we have 
Wu(N, e, a)  = 0(r  N  e 
W2k (N,e,a)  =  0(1), 
as N  -*  oo. 
PROOF:  In the model with 2k  neighbor matching it suffices to show that for 
e < ? there exist constants  N,  'q, and T, such that for all N > N 
min prob  (A(St+T)  > (1 -a)NIst  = s)  > -q. 
s 
From this it immediately follows  that  W2k(N,  E, a)  < T/'q  which provides the 
desired bound. 
To  begin,  consider  a  constrained  model  with  2m + 1 players on  a  line  of 
whom  players  -m,  -m  +1,  ...,-m  + k -  1 and  m -  k + 1,...,m  play B  in 
every period while the rest of the players play a best response to their 2k  closest 
neighbors with probability 1 -  e. Write p2kF  for the transition matrix, ,u' for the 
steady-state  distribution, and  A'  for the  state where  all unconstrained players 
play A  in this model. For 2m + 1 >  (k + 1Xk + 2) + 2k  a proof identical to that 
of  Theorem  l(a)  shows  ,(e)  -  1  as  e -> 0.  Pick  ?- such  that  e <?-  implies 
ii,(?)  > 1 -  a/2.  Now fix e < E. Because  p2k'  is ergodic we can choose  T such 
that  eg,P2k'(r)T(A')  >  1 -  3a/4  for  e,  an  initial  distribution putting mass  1 
on  B'. 
Let  Q2  be  the  underlying probability space  for the  circle model  with  co  E fi 
consisting of a uniform [0, 1] random variable  wit for each player at each point 
in time such that player i  mutates to  A  in period  t  if  wi, > 1 -  e  and to  B  if 
wit < e.  n  also acts as a probability space  for the  constrained model with the 
randomizations of player j  in that model corresponding to the randomizations 
of  player  1  + j  in the  standard model  on  the  circle. The  constrained player 0 
plays A  in a given period  only if player 1 on  the  circle does  so for the  same 
realization of  w)  with corresponding initial conditions. Hence, 
E(A(st+T)Ist =  s)  > N prob(Player 0 plays A in period t + Tls' = B' 
" N  k'p2k'(,F)T  (A')  > (1 -3al/4)N. 
Using  A(st+T) < N  we have the desired inequality 
1 
prob  (A(St+T)  > (1 -  a)Nlst  = s) >  - 
In the uniform model, let  N  be sufficiently large so that [q*(N  -  1)] < N/2. 
The  probability that  A(st+ 1) > (1 -  a)N  depends  only on whether  A(st)  is in 
{0,  .  . ., [q*(N -  1)1  -  11, {[q*(N  -  1)]), or {[q*(N  -  1)1  +  1,. ..,N}.  Write 0, LEARNING  1063 
7',1,  and 'r  2 for these three probabilities. Note  that  qo -?  0,  ql -*  0, and '_2-+  1, 
as  N  -*  oo for  8 <a  <q*.  Write  Wo, Wl, and  W2  for the  expected  wait until 
A(s,+7)>  (1 -  a)N  conditional  on  s,  lying in each  of  these  three  sets.  (W= 
Wu(N, 8, a).)  We have 
WO  = (1 -  (P1 +P2))(WO + 1) +p1(W1 + 1) 
+(P2-  %)(W2+  1)  +  %, 
WJ1,=ql(Wo  + 1) + (1-  (q  + q2))(W1 + 1) 
+  (q2  -7  l(W2  +  1)  + 7/l, 
W2  =rl(Wo  +  1)  +  r2(W1  +  1)  +  (1  -(r,  +  r2  +  %))(W2  +  1)  +  q2l 
with pi, qi, and ri as in (Al).  Solving these three equations gives a closed form 
expression for Wu(N, 8, a)  from which it follows that 
1  1 
WO  ~+ 
?Pi  +P2  Pi  +P2 
From the central limit theorem 
Pi  +P2  1 
q(  -? 
1)]( 
_-N 
(N  m>o). 
The desired result now follows by replacing the right-hand side of the expres- 
sion above by the approximation (see  Ross (1984, p. 162)): 
O-((x)  Xe-x2/2  X  x).0  Q.E.D. 
REMARKS:  1. As with Theorem 1, the proof that W2k(N,  8, a)  =  0(1)  applies 
to  more  general  matching rules. (See  Remark  1 after Theorem  1.) However, 
because the value of  ?- used in the construction must be independent of N,  the 
proof  extends  only  to  matching  rules  such  as  (1)  where  jN =f  N(d(i,  j)), 
fN(i)  >f(i)  for N  large, and f  is monotone decreasing  with ELI1f(i)  =  1/2. 
2.  Blume  (1992)  specifies  a  similar  model  of  interactions  among  spatially 
distributed players in a way which allows tools from statistical mechanics to be 
applied.  Principally,  his  model  differs  in  that  the  population  is  countable, 
strategies  are updated  asynchronously in continuous  time,  and randomization 
probabilities  are related  to  payoff, differences.  While  Blume  does  not  directly 
address the rate at which play converges in his model he is able to draw on an 
extensive  literature  to  determine  whether  behavior  is  ergodic.  The  obvious 
conjecture  is  that  play  in  an  infinite  population  model  is  ergodic  whenever 
convergence times in suitably defined finite population  approximations remain 
finite  as  N  ->  oo. 
Figure  1 illustrates the  dependence  of waiting times on the  population  size 




X  o  40- 
302  8 Neighbors 
k 
\  $-*--  ,  -  -  -  ------ 
-........................... 
.  ,".  ^  b~_____  _  ,___  __ 
20-  4 Neighbors 
10  \ 
2 Neighbors 
C 
0  o0  100  150  200  250  300  3T  400  450  500 
Population Size 
FIGURE 1.-Estimated  waiting times for various population sizes. 
graphed  for e = 0.05 and q* = 1/3. The waiting  times are sharply  decreasing  for 
small population  sizes and appear  remarkably  constant  for populations  of more 
than about 100 players.  It appears  that with local matching  rules evolutionary 
forces are not at all diminished  in large  populations  and that any  predictions  we 
make will be extremely  robust  to the size of the population. 
5.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
The contrasting  behavior  of models with local and uniform  matching  is not 
empirically  meaningful  when convergence  is very  slow even with local matching. 
For this reason, I now present two sets of numerical  simulations  which investi- 
gate further  the conditions  under  which local matching  rules allow evolutionary 
forces to determine play. The first set of  simulations  explores a variety of 
specifications  of the model of Section 2. Although  rapid  convergence  is hard to 
define, it is possible that evolutionary  forces will determine  play in a variety  of 
models with local matching.  The second set of simulations  discusses  an exten- 
sion of the basic model and argues  that rapid evolution  may also be seen in a 
much broader  range  of models. 
5.1.  Matching Rules 
We have already  seen that the risk dominant  equilibrium  arises  very quickly 
with two neighbor  matching.  I investigate  here the extent to which this remains 
true as the assumptions  of the two neighbor  rule are gradually  relaxed.  Typically 
we have only a rough  idea of the matching  process  which  best describes  a given 
population. We therefore hope that the predictions  of the model are fairly LEARNING  1065 
TABLE III 
EXPECTED  WAITING  TIMES  WITH VARIOUS  MATCHING  RULESa 
W2k(100, r, 0.25) 
?=0.025  ?=0.05  0.1 
2 Neighbors  11  8  6 
4 Neighbors  44  23  12 
8 Neighbors  93  25  11 
12 Neighbors  522  45  11 
a Payoffs  have  q*  =  1/3.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  less  than  2% of  the 
value  shown. 
robust  to the particular  specification  chosen. Recall that a transition  to the risk 
dominant  equilibrium  is possible  with very  few 8-probability  events if strategy  A 
is simultaneously  adopted by a small cluster of adjacent  players. It therefore 
seems reasonable that the likelihood of  a speedy transition  will be  greatly 
affected  by the factors  which allow for the existence of such stable clusters.  In 
particular,  I examine here the degree to which the matching  rule is concen- 
trated  on a few neighbors  and to which the groups  of neighbors  overlap. 
Table III describes  the behavior  of models with less concentrated  matching 
rules.  For k = 1, 2, 4, and 6, Monte Carlo  estimates  of the expected  waiting  time 
W2k(100, rE,0.25)  are given. Payoffs with q* =  1/3  (e.g. a =  2,  b =  1,  c =  0, 
d = 0) are assumed. Note that the effect of the matching  rule varies with the 
frequency  of the randomizations.  For the smallest value of  E shown, waiting 
times increase significantly  when players have more neighbors. In this case, 
evolution  is only likely to be seen when the matching  rule is concentrated  on a 
very  few neighbors.  For the larger  values of 8,  the waiting  times are shorter  and 
less dependent on the particular  matching  rule. Evolution  may even be faster 
for less concentrated  matching  rules as stable clusters  are almost sure to form 
immediately  and the speed at which they spread  becomes more important. 
The k  neighbor  matching  rules discussed so far are far from general. The 
assumption  that the players  are arranged  around  a circle has been maintained.8 
Inherent  in this assumption  is a great  overlap  of the groups  of neighbors  in that 
a player's neighbors'  neighbors are likely to be his neighbors as well. More 
realistic  models  would  usually  involve  less overlap.  For example,  if an economist's 
"neighbors"  include colleagues in her own department,  others with similar 
research  interests  and older friends,  then many  of the neighbors  might  not know 
each other. With less overlap,  evolution  may be slower because stable clusters 
must be larger. 
As a proxy  for the degree of overlap of groups of neighbors,  I explore the 
dimension  of the lattice on which the players  are arranged.  Besides arranging 
400 players around a circle, we can arrange  them at the vertices of a 20 x 20 
lattice on the surface  of a torus,  or on a 4 X 4 x 5 x 5 lattice in four dimensions. 
8 Blume (1992) discusses  the  effects of  the  lattice used  to represent  the  matching process in a 
similar model and notes that higher dimensional systems may behave very differently. 1066  GLENN  ELLISON 
FIGURE  2.-Eight  neighbor matching in one and two dimensions. 
Figure 2 pictures  the sets of neighbors  which give eight neighbor  matching  in 
one and two dimensions.  Moving  from one to two to four dimensions  reduces 
the maximum  number  of neighbors  which  any  two players  have in common  from 
six to four to two. 
For each of the lattices mentioned above, Table IV gives estimates of the 
expected waiting time  W(N, e, 0.25) again for payoffs with  q* = 1/3.  For most 
of the parameter  values shown, the expected waiting times are not greatly 
affected as we reduce the overlap  of the neighbor  groups  by moving  to higher 
dimensional  lattices.  However,  the increased  waiting  times in the eight neighbor 
model for e =  0.025 are a reminder  that the structure  of the matching  rule has 
the potential to greatly  affect the behavior  of the model. 
The general conclusion that local matching  leads to relatively  fast conver- 
gence appears  to be fairly  robust  to the choice of matching  rule. However,  when 
randomizations  are infrequent, there are reasonable models in which play 
converges  fairly slowly. In addition,  whether convergence  in say 50 periods is 
fast enough to be relevant  depends on the application.  As a result,  while local 
matching  allows evolutionary  forces to be felt in large populations,  we cannot 
predict that the risk dominant  equilibrium  will arise as confidently  as we are 
TABLE IV 
EXPECTED  WAITING  TIMES  FOR  DIFFERENT  GEOMETRIESa 
Four  Neighbor  Matching 
Expected  Wait 
Lattice  =  0.025  E  =  0.05  E  =  0.1 
400x1  46  23  12 
20x20  43  21  12 
Eight  Neighbor  Matching 
Expected  Wait 
Lattice  =  0.025  E  =  0.05  E  =  0.1 
400 X 1  70  28  11 
20 X 20  122  21  9 
4X4X5X5  1740  32  8 
a Payoffs  have  q* =  1/3.  Waiting  times  are  until  3/4  of  the  players  play 
A.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  less  than  3% of  the  values  shown  for  all 
estimates  except  the  E =  0.025  8 neighbor  cases. LEARNING  1067 
TABLE V 
WAITING  TIMES  FOR  HETEROGENEOUS  POPULATIONSa 
Expected  Wait 
Variance  of  u,(B,  B)  E  =  0.025  E = 0.05  E =  0.1 
0  522  45  11 
0.1  75  19  9 
0.2  28  14  7 
a Expected  waiting  times  are for populations  of  100 players with  12 neighbor 
matching,  a =  0.25,  and with  the  distribution  of  payoffs  matching  that  gener- 
ated  by independent  draws  from  lognormal  distributions  with  E(u,(B,  B))  =  1 
and  u(A,  A)  D (17/7)u,(B,  B).  Estimated  standard  errors  are less  than  3% of 
the  values  shown. 
able to predict  that historical  factors  determine  play in the model with uniform 
matching. 
5.2.  Heterogeneity 
In a large population  it is reasonable  to assume that players  have different 
tastes. I suggest  here that this heterogeneity  may allow rapid  convergence  for a 
much broader  range of specifications  than was previously  indicated.  Intuitively, 
in a diverse  population  there will be a few players  who derive great utility  from 
the equilibrium  (A, A) and will therefore  play  A if only a few of their neighbors 
have done so. In the vicinity  of these players,  smaller  stable clusters  of players 
playing A  are possible. Such clusters will therefore arise more quickly.  Once 
they do the fact that a few players prefer (B, B) will do little to slow their 
spread. 
Table V examines  the effect of such heterogeneity  on the expected waiting 
time. The players are assumed to  have heterogeneous tastes ui(A, A)  and 
uj(B, B) with the empirical  distribution  of the utilities matching  that of inde- 
pendent draws  from  lognormal  distributions  with ui(A, A) D  (17/7)ui(B, B).9  A 
population  of 100 players  with 12 neighbor  matching  is assumed.  The first line 
of the table gives the familiar  waiting  times for a homogeneous  population  and 
subsequent  lines record  the effect of increasing  dispersion  in the payoff  distribu- 
tions. (E(ui(B, B)) is fixed at one.) To facilitate  interpretation  of the scale, note 
that when var(ui(B,  B)) = 0.2, there is one player who plays A  if only one 
neighbor  did so, and 2 players  who will not play A unless 8 or more neighbors 
did so. When evolution  is already  rapid  for a homogeneous  population,  hetero- 
geneity has only a limited effect. More importantly  though, when E is small 
heterogeneity  dramatically  increases  the rate at which play converges. 
9 The constant 17/7  is used for comparison with the results of Section 5.1. When var(ui(B, B)) = 0, 
q* = 7/24  is in the center of the interval (3/12,4/12)  and the dynamics are identical to those of the 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
In  this  paper  I  have  discussed  a  class  of  coordination  game  in  order  to 
examine  the  implications  of  a  learning  process  among  a  large  population  of 
boundedly rational players. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) introduced such a 
model  and  showed  how  the  players' myopic  adjustments create  evolutionary 
forces which may select  among the equilibria. 
The analysis yields several conclusions which appear to be fairly robust. Most 
generally, the  rate  at which  a dynamic model  converges can be  an important 
consideration for economic applications. In the coordination problems discussed 
here,  the  nature  of  the  matching  rule  which  describes  the  interactions  in  a 
population helps determine the behavior we will observe. When each individual 
cares equally about coordinating with a great many opponents,  play will exhibit 
great inertia and reflect arbitrary  historical factors for a long period of time. On 
the other hand, in communities in which players are only likely to be matched 
with a few close  friends or colleagues  evolutionary forces may be felt  early in 
the game. I would therefore hope that models with local interactions will allow 
the further application of evolutionary models to social behavior. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF  OF THEOREM  2: We  begin  with  a  general  discussion  of  second  largest  eigenvalues 
applicable  to  both  transition  matrices.  For  v  a  probability distribution on  S, vs  will  denote  the 
probability assigned to state s. It will often be convenient to write v as a 2N-tuple ordered as 
(Vi  V,  *  *..* ) 
so that, for example, (0, 1, 0, . . .0, ) represents a distribution which assigns probability 1 to all players 
playing  B.  (In writing this vector,  some  ordering is understood  for the  2N -  2  states  I have  not 
specially named. Each of these states will be assigned probability zero in the 2N-tuples which appear 
below.) 
Let  CPp(_)(x)  be  the  characteristic  polynomial  of  P(E).  CPp(_)  and  CPp(o)  are  polynomials  of  the 
same degree whose coefficients converge as E -+  0  so  the set of roots of  CPp(,)  converges to the set 
of  roots  of  CPp(0  (with  multiplicity).  If  we  write  the  eigenvalues  of  P(E)  with  multiplicity  as 
1=A1(E)>IA2()[  |A3(?)I  N  2  IA2v(E)I  this implies 
I|  AI(? 
| 
I  AimO |  .1 
Note  that the matrices P(O) have a two dimensional space of eigenvectors of eigenvalue  1 spanned 
by (1, 0, O,  . . .0, )  and (0, 1, 0, . . .0, ).  These  eigenvectors  correspond  to  the  steady states where  all 
players coordinate on  A  and B respectively. Assuming for now that P(O) has no other steady states 
or cycles, all other eigenvalues  are of magnitude less than one.  Therefore,  A2(E)  -4  1 and all other 
eigenvalues are bounded  away from 1 for E near zero. 
Let  v(E)  be an eigenvector with eigenvalue  A2(E) normalized so that IIv(E)II  = 1 and vB(E)  > 0. I 
first show  that  v(E)  (-11,0,...,00)  v.  If  not,  for  some  7 > 0  we  can  find  a  sequence  {?1 
converging to zero for which  II  v(E,) -  v II>  71. Choosing an appropriate subsequence we may assume 
10 See Franklin (1968, p. 191). LEARNING  1069 
that v(Ed)  converges  to a nonzero  limit v*. Note that 
v*P(0)  =  irm  V(Ei)P(Ei)  =  lrm A2(E,)v(E,)  = v* 
j-*0  i->oo 
so that v* is an eigenvector  of P(0) with  eigenvalue  1. This gives v* = (x, y, 0,...,  0) with y >  0 and 
max(lxl, Iy  I) = 1. Further,  as P(E) is a probability  transition  matrix,  the sum of the elements of 
v(Ci) is equal to the sum of the elements  of A2(ai)v(Ei). This is only possible  with A2(Ci)  < 1 if the 
sum is zero. This gives the contradiction  v* = v. 
First,  consider  the model  with two neighbor  matching.  Throughout  the proof  I assume  that N  is 
odd.  The  proof for  N  even  is  similar although more complicated because of  the  cycle 
AB  BA  AB  . A complete proof is available from the author on request. 
When N  is odd, P2(0) has only A-  and B as steady  states and has no cycles  so by the reasoning 
above we know A2(E) -+  1 and  v(?)  -+ (-1,  1, 0,...,  0). Hence,  for E sufficiently small, vf(E)  >  0 SO 
we can write the second largest  eigenvalue  as 
E, PsB(--)v,(--) 
seS 
A2(?  )  =_  VB() 
El  PS'B (--)vs(?) 
=p24  (F)  +  soB  s# 
We have 
2,,(E)  =  (1  -N?  +  O(E2)). 
For s * B, the successor  of s in the model with no noise has at least two players  playing  A,  so a 
transition  from s to B requires  at least two --probability  events.  We then have  that ps(B)=  0(s2) 
and vs(?)  is bounded.  Hence, p 2B4(E)Vs(s)  =  o(?)  and 
AAE)  =  1  -NE  +  o(E) 
as desired. 
For the uniform  model,  we simplify  the problem  by looking  instead  at a Markov  process  on the 
N + 1 element  state space A(S).  Formally,  we define a transition  matrix  P' on A(S)  by 
Pt;  (  ? )-  Pr,(i)  s(?) 
A(s)=j 
where  r(i) is any  state  with A(r(i))  =  i. Note that  we can write  P' as a product  P' = DPUE where  D 
is an N + 1 x 2N  matrix  which  maps e1 to er()  and E is a 2N  x  N + 1 matrix  which  classifies  states 
by mapping e5 to  eA(S)  The matrix F'  will be useful because its second largest eigenvalue  is 
identical  to that  of PU for E  small.  To see this,  note that  the eigenvector  of PU(E) associated  with  A2 
satisfies v(e) -+ v =  (-  1,10,...,0).  Hence v(E)E * 0 for E small, and v(E)EP'=  v(E)EDPUE = 
v(E)PUE = A2v(E)E, so that v(E)E is an eigenvector  of P' with eigenvalue  A2.  Because P' has an 
unique  non-unit  eigenvalue  with magnitude  converging  to one, the second  largest  eigenvalues  of Pu 
and P' must  coincide. 
We can further  reduce  the dimensionality  of the problem  by noting  that p1j(E)  = pZTJ()  if states i 
and i' have the same successor  in the model  with no noise. Hence, we may  write 
P  (?-)-=QR(--) 
where 
1  0  0 
1  O  O 
Q=  0  1  0 
O  0  1 
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groups  the states into three classes,  the precursors  of 0, [q*(N -  1)], and the precursors  of N, and 
R(s)  is an 3 x N + 1 matrix  which gives the probability  of each state arising  given  the class of the 
previous  state. For example, 
RI,(s-)  =p1j(s)  Vi e  (0, 1,.  [q*(N-  1)] -  1}. 
From  this decomposition,  it is clear that P'(O  has exactly  three nonzero  eigenvalues. 
Let C(s)  = R(s)Q.  C(s)  is a 3 x 3 matrix  which  can be regarded  as giving  the transitions  between 
the three classes  of states.  Note that P'(E)fl  =  QC(E)' -  'R(E). Let  v be an eigenvector  of P'(s  with 
eigenvalue  A  > 0. We have vQ =*  0 and vQC(s-) =  vQR(E)Q =  AvQ so vQ is an eigenvector  of C(s) 
with eigenvalue  A.  As C(s-) has rank  3, this gives  a one-to-one  correspondence  between  the nonzero 
eigenvalues  of P'(s)  and the nonzero  eigenvalues  of C(s). 
We can write 
l(PI  +P2)  PI  P 
(Al)  C(-)= 
q 
1-(q,  +q2)  q2 
where, for example,  p1 gives the probability  of a transition  from any precursor  of 0 to the state 
[q*(N-.  1)], 
N 
[q*(N...  1)])f*N1(  )N-fq*(N1I)1 
Look at the characteristic  polynomial  of C(s)  as a polynomial  in z  1 -  A. We find that 
(A2)  Det (C(s)  -  kl)  =  Z( Z2 -  alz + ao) 
with 
a, =P1  +P2 +q1  + q2 +r1  +  r2 
ao =  (Pl  + P2)(q1  + q2) + (q1 + q2)(r1 + r2) + (r, + r2)(PI  ? P2) 
-  q2  r2 - plql  - P2r1- 
The root z = 0 corresponds  to the eigenvalue  A  =  1. Let Z1(E) >1  Z2(E) be the other two roots  of 
this equation.  As s --*0, 
Z1(s  + Z2(s)  - 
because  q2(s-) --)  1 when N -  [  q  *(N -  1)]  > [ q  *(N -  1)] and all other  terms  in the expression  for a  1 
converge  to zero. We also have 
z1(s-)Z2(s-)  =  Q([-  q*(N-1)1) 
as q2(s)P1(s-)  =  Q(E [q*(N-  1)  and all other  terms  in the expression  for ao are of strictly  higher  order. 
Hence, we must have zl(E)  --* 1 and Z2(g)  =  Q(_,fq*(N-I)j).  Clearly,  1 -  Z2(E)  is the second largest 
eigenvalue  in absolute  value for sufficiently  small s  so the desired result for the uniform  model 
follows  from  our characterization  ru(s-) =  1-_  Z2(E). 
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